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Abstract— Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups and 
institutions to determine for themselves, when, how and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to 
others. How to leak authoritative secrets in an elegant way? 
The paper aims to solve this problem. The desired security 
properties i.e. Semantic-Security; Recipient-Designation; 
Verification-Dependence; Designated-Verifier Signature-
Verifiability; Public Signature-Verifiability; Recipient-
Ambiguity; Designated-Verifier Recipient-Verifiability; 
Public Recipient-Verifiability; Signer-Ambiguity; Signer-
Verifiability are specified in secret leakage. Based on Chow-
Yiu-Hui’s ID-based ring signature scheme and techniques of 
zero-knowledge proof, an ID-based controlled secret leakage 
scheme is proposed. The proposed scheme satisfies all 
specified security properties and can be used in trust 
negotiation.
Index Terms— privacy, ring signature, authenticated 
encryption, zero-knowledge proof 
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of the electronic commerce, 
commonly known as e-commerce or eCommerce, is 
raising new research questions since the spread of the 
Internet, a great number of which are centered around 
security, trust, and privacy. Security, trust, and privacy 
has objectives including confidentiality (secrecy), data 
integrity (non-alteration), authentication (identity 
corroboration of an entity and data origin), and non-
repudiation (prevents the denial of previous 
commitments).
Privacy is important because privacy helps individuals 
maintain their autonomy and individuality. The most 
common definition of privacy is the one by Westin: 
“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups and 
institutions to determine for themselves, when, how and 
to what extent information about them is communicated 
to others” [1]. According to Westin’s definition, 
individuals as well as groups and institutions have a right 
to privacy. In a fully networked society, privacy is 
seriously endangered and cannot be sufficiently protected 
by privacy legislation. Cryptography technologies now 
are valuable tools for privacy protection in addition to 
privacy legislation. 
We consider the following scenario of secret leakage 
[2]: If a police wants to arrest a criminal but knows few 
clues about him, so it promises to give an award to a 
person in some group who could provide the most 
important clue after the criminal is arrested. A group 
member Alice can provide something to a designated 
policeman Bob, but she is not sure whether her message 
could be the most important one. How to leak this clue in 
an elegant way? To protect the authoritative secret from 
propagating and anonymity of the member Alice and the 
policeman Bob, we propose controlled secret leakage 
scheme.  
It is unsuitable to use traditional authentication on the 
network where entities are not foreknown to each other. 
Trust negotiation is now wide used in electronic 
commerce [3]. In order for strangers to conduct secure 
transactions, a sufficient level of mutual trust must be 
established. Trust negotiation is an approach to 
establishing trust between strangers through the exchange 
of authoritative secrets. Thus, controlled secret leakage 
scheme can be used in trust negotiation. 
Often when two parties communicate over a network, 
they have two main security goals: privacy and 
authentication. Privacy means that a passive adversary 
who views the ciphertext cannot “understand” the content 
of the message. Authenticity means that an active 
adversary cannot successfully fabricate a ciphertext in 
such a way that Bob will believe that Alice was the 
originator. Horster et al. first proposed an authenticated 
encryption scheme [4]. Authenticated encryption scheme 
aimed to achieve the purpose that the signature can only 
be verified by some specified recipients while keeping 
the message secret from the public.  
At the conference Asiacrypt 2001, Ron Rivest, Adi 
Shamir, and Yael Tauman introduced the notion of a ring 
signature in the paper “How to leak a secret” [5]. A ring 
signature can be considered as a simplified group 
signature with no manager, no group setup procedure, 
and no revocation mechanism against signer’s anonymity. 
In a ring signature scheme, the information of all possible 
signers, i.e. ring members, serves as a part of the ring 
signature for the signed message. Ring signature makes it 
possible to specify a set of possible signers without 
revealing which member actually produced the signature. 
Herein, the anonymous property is referred to as signer-
ambiguity. Applications of ring signatures include 
leaking secrets and authenticated communication. For 
instance, a ring signature could be used to provide an 
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anonymous signature from "a high-ranking White House 
official", without revealing which official signed the 
message. 
Lv et al. combined the two notations of ring signature 
and authenticated encryption together and obtained a new 
type of authenticated encryption, called ring authenticated 
encryption [2]. Ring authenticated encryption has the 
following security properties: semantic-security, 
recipient-designation, verification-dependence, 
verification-convertibility, recipient-ambiguity, recipient-
verifiability, signer-ambiguity and signer-verifiability. In 
[2], Lv et al. also presented a ring authenticated 
encryption scheme based on discrete logarithm problem. 
In [6], Cao et al. found some weaknesses in Lv et al.’s 
scheme that Lv et al.’s scheme cannot achieve signer-
verifiability and recipient-verifiability properties. Cao et 
al. also proposed an improved ring authenticated 
encryption scheme to eliminate these weaknesses.  
Identity based public key cryptography proposed by 
Shamir in 1984 [7] can simplify key management and 
remove the necessity of public key certificates. This is 
desirable, especially for these applications which involve 
a large number of public keys in each execution, such as 
ring signatures. Recently the bilinear pairings have been 
found advantageous in designing various cryptographic 
schemes, especially for those using identity-based public 
keys, e.g. the identity-based encryption and the identity-
based signature. In [9][10], Boneh and Frankliny 
proposed a fully functional identity-based encryption 
scheme. The scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the 
random oracle model assuming BDHP is hard. In [11], 
Zhang and Kim presented an ID-based ring signature 
scheme, which can be built on any GDH group. Their 
scheme satisfies the unconditional ambiguity and the non-
forgeability properties. In [8], based on Boneh and 
Frankliny’s ID-Based encryption scheme [9][10] and 
Zhang and Kim’s ID-Based ring signature scheme [11] 
Cao et al. construct an ID-based ring authenticated 
encryption scheme from bilinear pairings. 
In 1985, Goldwasser et al. introduced the notion of 
zero-knowledge (ZK) proof [12]. A zero-knowledge 
proof is an interactive method for one party (the prover) 
to prove to another (the verifier) that a statement is true, 
without revealing anything other than the verity of the 
statement. An interactive proof usually takes the form of 
a challenge-response protocol, in which the prover and 
the verifier exchange messages and the verifier outputs 
either “accept” or “reject’ at the end of the protocol. 
Zero-knowledge proofs have the following properties: 
Completeness. The verifier always accepts the proof if 
the fact is true and both the prover and the verifier follow 
the protocol.  
Soundness. The verifier always rejects the proof if the 
fact is false, as long as the verifier follows the protocol.  
Zero-knowledgeness. The verifier learns nothing 
beyond the validity of the fact and cannot even later 
prove the fact to anyone else. 
Demonstrating in zero-knowledge the possession of 
digital signatures can protect the privacy of signature 
holders from dissemination of signatures by verifiers and 
have many cryptographic applications such as 
anonymous authentication, identity escrow, publicly 
verifiable secret sharing and group signature. Given the 
designated-signature, the designated-verifier can verify 
that the message was signed by the signer, but is unable 
to convince anyone else of this fact. 
In this paper, our main contribution is to specify 
security properties of secret leakage, define controlled 
secret leakage scheme to protect the secret from 
propagating and anonymity of the participants, design an 
ID-based controlled secret leakage scheme. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
give the definition of the controlled secret leakage 
scheme and the desired security properties. In Section 3, 
we describe the basic concept on bilinear pairings. In 
Section 4, we construct our controlled secret leakage 
scheme. In Section 4, we show the proposed scheme 
satisfies correctness property and security properties. A 
conclusion will be given in Section 5. 
II. DEFINITIONS
A.  Definition of Controlled Secret Leakage Scheme 
Definition 1: (Controlled secret leakage scheme).
The controlled secret leakage scheme is specified by 
seven algorithms (protocols). The specification of the 
controlled secret leakage scheme is shown in Fig. 1.  
Signature Generation: The algorithm takes as input 
message M, the recipient Bob’s public key, the signer 
Alice’s private key and all the ring members’ identity list 
L which includes the signer Alice, and outputs a ring 
signature S. The ring signature S will be published in 
Bulletin Board System (BBS) or send to the recipient 
Bob. We assume that anyone can intercept the signature S
in transit. 
Message Recovery and Verification: The algorithm 
takes as input a signature S and the recipient Bob’s secret 
key, outputs the authenticated message M and returns 1 or 
0 meaning accept or reject the information that the 
signature S is created by a ring member, respectively. We 
require that the algorithm outputs the authenticated 
message M and returns 1 if the ring signature S is 
generated by the signer honestly. 
Zero Knowledge Proof of a Ring Signature: Zero-
knowledge proof of a ring signature is a method for the 
recipient Bob to prove to a verifier Carol that the 
message M is signed by a ring member listed in the ring 
set L without revealing any other information. Zero-
knowledge proof can control the secret leakage and 
prevent secret propagation. The algorithm takes as input a 
signature S, a message M, the verifier’s private key and a 
parameter ?1 that can only be computed by the recipient 
Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the 
information that the signature S is really created by a ring 
member, respectively. We require that the algorithm l 
returns 1 if two parties do the protocol honestly. 
Zero Knowledge Proof of Recipient: Zero-knowledge 
proof of recipient is an interactive method for the 
recipient Bob to prove to a verifier Carol that Bob is 
actually the designated recipient without revealing any 
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other information. The algorithm takes as input a 
signature S, a message M, the verifier’s private key and a 
parameter ?1 that can only be computed by the recipient 
Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the 
information that the signature S is really sent to Bob,
respectively. We require that the algorithm returns 1 if 
two parties do the protocol honestly. 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature: The 
algorithm takes as input a signature S, a message M and a 
parameter ?2 that can only be computed by the recipient 
Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the 
information that the signature S is really created by a ring 
member, respectively. We require that the algorithm 
returns 1 if Bob does the protocol honestly. 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of Recipient: The algorithm 
takes as input a signature S, a message M and a parameter 
?2 released by Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or 
reject the information that the signature S is really sent to 
Bob, respectively. We require that the algorithm returns 1 
if Bob is the real recipient. 
Signer Verification: The algorithm takes as input the 
signature S and a parameter ? produced when Alice
creates the signature, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept 
or reject the information that Alice is the actual signer, 
respectively. We require that the algorithm returns 1 if 
the signature S is really produced by Alice. The algorithm 
should satisfy the condition that only the actual signer 
Alice could provide such a parameter ? that makes it 
equal 1 corresponding to the certain signature S and that 
will not release the signer’s private key. 
B.  Security Properties of Controlled Secret Leakage 
Scheme 
Definition 2: (Security properties of controlled 
secret leakage scheme). A controlled secret leakage 
scheme has the following security properties. 
Semantic-Security: Any computationally-bounded 
adversary cannot determine whether his guessed message 
is the actual message signed by the original signer, 
although he gets a valid signature. 
Recipient-Designation: Only the designated recipient 
can recover the message and verify the ring signature. 
Verification-Dependence: If the actual signer and the 
legal recipient do not reveal some parameters, any 
verifier cannot check the validity of the signature even 
though he gets the message and the corresponding 
signature. 
Designated-Verifier Signature-Verifiability: A 
designated verifier can be convinced that the message M
is signed by a ring member listed in the ring set L by the 
actual signer or the legal recipient, but the designated 
verifier is unable to convince anyone else of this fact. 
Public Signature-Verifiability: Anyone can verify 
whether a ring signature is actually produced by at least 
one of the possible signers after the recipient reveals 
some parameters. 
Recipient-Ambiguity: Anyone cannot know to whom a 
signature is sent while verifying its validity except the 
actual signer and the legal recipient. 
Designated-Verifier Recipient-Verifiability: A 
designated verifier can be convinced who is actually the 
designated recipient by the legal recipient, but the 
designated verifier is unable to convince anyone else of 
this fact. 
Figure 1.  Controlled secret leakage scheme. 
Alice Bob
Carol
Anyone
Signature Generation 
Message Recovery and Verification 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of Recipient 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature 
Zero Knowledge Proof of Recipient 
Signer Verification 
Group 
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Public Recipient-Verifiability: Anyone can be 
convinced who is actually the designated recipient by the 
actual signer or the legal recipient. 
Signer-Ambiguity: Anyone cannot determine the 
identity of the actual signer in a ring of size r with 
probability greater than 1/r if the actual signer is 
unwilling to expose himself. 
Signer-Verifiability: The actual signer can prove to the 
recipient that it is he who actually signs the signature. 
Trust negotiation enables two parties with no pre-
existing relationship to establish the trust necessary to 
perform sensitive transactions via the mutual disclosure 
of the sensitive content. Therefore, controlled secret 
leakage scheme can be used in trust negotiation. 
III. BILINEAR PAIRINGS
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group, whose order is a 
prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the 
same order q: Let e: G1 ? G1 ? G2 be a bilinear pairing 
with the following properties: 
Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ? G1, a,
b ? Zq
Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ? G1 such that 
e(P, Q) ? 1, in other words, the map does not send all 
pairs in G1 ? G1 to the identity in G2.
Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to 
compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ? G1.
A bilinear map satisfying the three properties above is 
said to be an admissible bilinear map. We note that the 
Weil and Tate pairings associated with supersingular 
ellipticcurves or abelian varieties can be modified to 
create such bilinear maps. 
Suppose that G1 is an additive group. Now we describe 
five mathematical problems. 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given two group 
elements P and Q, find an integer n, such that Q = nP
whenever such an integer exists. 
Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): For a, b, c
? Zq*, given P, aP, bP, cP decide whether c ? ab mod q.
If so, (P, aP, bP, cP) is called a valid Diffie-Hellman 
tuple. 
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP): For a, b, c
? Zq*, given P, aP, bP, cP compute abcP.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): For 
a, b ? Zq*, given P, aP, bP, compute abP.
Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem (GDHP): A class of 
problems where DDHP is easy while CDHP is hard. 
When the DDHP is easy but the CDHP is hard on the 
group G1, we call G1 a Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) 
group. Such groups can be found on supersingular elliptic 
curves or hyperelliptic curves over finite field, and the 
bilinear parings can be derived from the Weil or Tate 
pairing e: G1 ? G1 ? G2.
We have the relationship of the BDHP and CDHP that 
the BDHP in < G1, G2, e> is no harder than the CDHP in 
G1 or G2. In other words, an algorithm for CDHP in G1 or 
G2 is sufficient for solving BDHP in < G1, G2, e>.
We assume through this paper that BDHP is 
intractable, which means there is no polynomial time 
algorithm to solve BDHP, CDHP or DLP with 
nonnegligible probability.  
IV. ID-BASED CONTROLLED SECRET LEAKAGE SCHEME
Our scheme can be built from any bilinear map e: G1 ?
G1 ? G2 between two groups G1, G2 as long as BDHP in 
G1 is hard and the DDHP in G1 is easy. 
Setup: Let (G1, +) and (G2,?) denote cyclic groups of 
prime order q, let P be a generator of G1 and the bilinear 
pairing is given as e: G1?G1 ? G2. Pick a random s ? Zq*
and set Ppub = sP. Choose cryptographic hash function H:
{0, 1}* ? Zq*, H1: {0, 1}*?G1*, H2: G2 ?{0, 1}n, H3:
{0, 1}n?{0, 1}n? Zq* and H4: {0, 1}n?{0, 1}n. Choose a 
pseudorandom generator F: {0, 1}n ? G1. The message 
space is M = {0, 1}n. The master-key is s ? Zq*.
Extract: For a given string ID ? {0, 1}* the PKG 
computes QID = H1(ID) , and sets the private key dID to be 
dID = sQID where s is the master key. 
Signature Generation: Let IDi be a ring member’s 
identity, and 
iID
d be the private key associated with IDi
for i = 0, 1, …, N ? 1, where N is the measure of the 
anonymity set. Let L = {IDi: 0 ? i ? N – 1} be the set of 
identities. The real signer Alice’s identity IDAlice is ring 
member IDk listed in L.
Step 1. To sign a message M ? {0, 1}n, the signer, 
Alice say, who knows the identity IDBob of the recipient 
Bob, whose corresponding secret key is 
BobID
d . Using 
Boneh-Frankliny’s ID-based encryption scheme [9][10]
Alice encrypts M under the public key IDBob.
Compute 
BobID
Q = H1(IDBob) ? G1*,
? Choose a random ? ?{0, 1}n,
? Set r = H3(?; M),
? Set the ciphertext of M to be <U, V, W>: U = rP,
V = ? ? 2 ( )Bob
r
IDH g and W = M ? H4(?) where 
BobID
g = e(
BobID
Q , Ppub) ? G2.
Step 2. Choose a random r1 ? Zq*, and compute X = 
r1P, Y = 1
Bob
r
IDg and Z = H(U || V || W || M || X || Y).
Step 3. To sign Z Alice utilizes Chow-Yiu-Hui’s ID-
based ring signature scheme [13]. 
? Choose a random seed A ? {0, 1}n, for i = k + 1, 
…, N – 1, 0, 1, …, k ? 1(i.e., the value of i all 
modulo N), compute Ai = F((A + i – k) mod N), 
and hi = H(Z, L, Ai). 
? Choose a random integer r’ ? Zq*, compute Ak = 
r’
kID
Q – ( )
ii i ID
i k
A h Q
?
?? .
? Compute hk = H(Z, L, Ak) and c = (hk + r’)
kID
d
where 
k AliceID ID
d d? .
? Choose a random r2 ? Zq*, and compute X1= r2P,
Y1 = 2
Bob
r
IDg and c1 = c + H1(Y1). 
? Select 0 (i.e., N) as the glue value, the resulting 
ring signature S is the (N + 7)-tuple (L, U, V, W,
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X, A0, …, AN–1, X1, c1). 
Step 4. Finally, Alice sends S to the recipient Bob and 
keeps the seed A secret. An adversary can intercept S in 
this step. 
Message Recovery and Verification: After receiving 
the signature S = (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, X1, c1), the 
recipient Bob does the following. 
Step 1. If U ? G1* reject the signature. 
? Compute ? = V ? H2(e(
BobID
d , U)).
? Compute M = W ? H4(?) . 
? Set r = H3(?, M). Test that U = rP. If not, reject 
the signature. 
Step 2. Compute Y = e(
BobID
d , X) and Z = H(U || V || W
|| M || X || Y).
Step 3. Compute Y1 = e(
BobID
d ,X1) and c = c1 ? H1(Y1).
Step 4. The validity of the signature is verified by 
checking that hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ? i ? N – 1) and that  
e(P, c) = e(Ppub,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? )
Zero Knowledge Proof of a Ring Signature: If Bob (or 
the signer Alice) wants to prove to any designated verifier 
Carol that the message M is signed by a ring member 
listed in L without revealing any other information, they 
can do as follows. 
Step 1. Bob computes W1 = e(
CarolID
Q , c) and sends the 
message M, the parameter Y and the parameters (L, U, V,
W, X, A0, …, AN–1, W1) to Carol.
Step 2. Carol computes Z = H(U || V || W || M || X || Y). 
Carol can be convinced that the message M is signed by a 
ring member listed in L if hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ? i ? N – 1) 
and W1 = e(
CarolID
d ,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? ).
Zero Knowledge Proof of Recipient: If Bob wants to 
prove to any designated verifier Carol that the signature S
is actually sent to Bob without revealing any other 
information, they can do as follows: 
Step 1. Bob chooses a random nonce r3 ? {0, 1}n and 
computes W1 = e(
CarolID
Q , c).
Step 2. Bob sends the message M, the nonce r3, the 
parameter Y and the parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, 
AN–1, W1) to Carol.
Step 3. Carol computes Z = H(U || V || W || M || X || Y). 
Carol can be convinced that the message M is signed by a 
ring member listed in L if hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ? i ? N – 1) 
and W1 = e(
CarolID
d ,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? ). Otherwise, 
terminate the protocol. 
Step 4. Carol chooses random integers r4, r5, r6 ? Zq*,
and computes T1 = r4P + r5X, U1 = r6
CarolID
Q , V1 = (r6 + 
H(r3, T1, U1))
CarolID
d . Carol sends (T1, U1, V1) to Bob.
Here to sign (r3, T1) Carol utilizes Cha-Cheon’s ID-based 
signature scheme [14].  
Step 5. Bob checks the freshness of r3 and the validity 
of the signature of (r3, T1) by checking whether (P, Ppub,
U1 + H(r3, T1, U1)
CarolID
Q , V1 ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman 
tuple. 
Step 6. Bob computes W2 = H(e(
BobID
d , T1)) and then 
sends W2 to Carol.
Step 7: Carol checks whether W2 = H( 4
Bob
r
IDg ·
5rY )
where 
BobID
g = e(
BobID
Q , Ppub). Only if they hold does 
Carol accept that the signature is sent to Bob.
Publicly Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature: If Bob
(or the signer Alice) wants to prove to any verifier that the 
message M is signed by a ring member listed in L, they 
can do as follows. 
Step 1. Bob publishes the message M, the parameter Y
and the parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, c).
Step 2. The verifier computes Z = H(U || V || W || M || X
|| Y). The validity of the ring signature is verified by 
checking that hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ? i ? N – 1) and that  
e(P, c) = e(Ppub,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? ).
Publicly Verifiable Proof of Recipient: If Bob (or the 
signer Alice) wants to prove to any verifier that the 
signature S is actually sent to Bob, they can do as follows: 
Step 1. Bob publishes the message M, the parameter Y,
? and the parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, c).   
Step 2. The verifier computes Z = H(U || V || W || M || X
|| Y). The validity of the ring signature is verified by 
checking that hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ? i ? N – 1) and that  
e(P, c) = e(Ppub,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? ).
Otherwise, terminate the protocol.  
Step 3. The verifier does the following. 
? Compute 
BobID
Q = H1(IDBob),
? Set r* = H3(?; M),
? Compute U* = r*P, V* = ? ?
*
2 ( )Bob
r
IDH g and W
*
= M ? H4(?) where 
BobID
g = e(
BobID
Q , Ppub).
Step 4: The verifier checks whether U* = U, V* = V,
and W* = W. Only if they hold does the verifier accept 
that the signature is sent to Bob.
Signer Verification: The actual signer Alice’s identity 
IDAlice is a ring member listed in L. If Alice is willing to 
prove to the recipient Bob that she actually leaked the 
message M, then she does the following. 
Step 1. Bob verifies that the signature S = (L, U, V, W,
X, A0, …, AN–1, X1, c1) is sent to him. The method is same 
as Message Recovery and Verification. 
Step 2. Alice sends the seed A and her identity IDAlice to 
Bob.
Step 3. For i = k + 1, …, N – 1, 0, 1, …, k ? 1, compute 
*
iA  = F((A + i – k) mod N) and checks if 
*
iA = Ai. If they 
all hold, then Bob convinces that Alice is the real signer. 
Reject, otherwise. 
JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS, VOL. 4, NO. 1, JANUARY 2009 65
© 2009 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
V. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A.  Correctness 
The following theorems are trivially true. 
Theorem 1: If the (N + 7)-tuple (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, 
AN–1, X1, c1) is a signature of a message M produced by 
Alice honestly, the recipient Bob will surely recover and 
verify the message M correctly from the signature. 
Theorem 2: If the prover executes Zero Knowledge 
Proof of a Ring Signature; Zero Knowledge Proof of 
Recipient; Publicly Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature; 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of Recipient; and Signer 
Verification honestly, an honest verifier can always 
achieve the stated aim of the protocol. 
Number footnotes separately in superscripts 1, 2, ….
Place the actual footnote at the bottom of the column in 
which it was cited, as in this column. See first page 
footnote as an example. 
B.  Security Properties 
In this subsection, we will examine the security of the 
proposed scheme. 
Semantic-Security: After an adversary gets the 
signature (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, X1, c1), he cannot 
guess the corresponding message M and c, since he 
cannot correctly compute the parameter Y from X and the 
parameter Y1 from X1. If the adversary tries to compute Y
and Y1 without known private key 
BobID
d , he has to 
compute r1 from X and r2 from X1, that is a hard DL 
problem. So our scheme can provide semantic security of 
the message M and can prevent gauss attacks.  
Recipient-Designation: The proposed ring 
authenticated encryption scheme uses Boneh and 
Frankliny’s identity-based encryption [9][10]. Anyone 
cannot recover the message M without the private key 
BobID
d . Only the designated recipient can recover the 
message M and the parameter Y, Z, c. Using M, Y, Z, c,
the recipient can verify the ring signature. 
Verification-Dependence: If the actual signer and the 
legal recipient do not reveal the parameter Y, any verifier 
cannot compute Z, therefore cannot verify the validity of 
the signature, even he knows the message M and the 
signature S. If the adversary tries to compute Y without 
known private key 
BobID
d , he has to compute r1 from X,
that is a hard DL problem. 
Designated-Verifier Signature-Verifiability: 
Completeness of Zero Knowledge Proof of a Ring 
Signature has been show in theorem 2.  
Here we examine soundness of Zero Knowledge Proof 
of a Ring Signature.  
Only the designated verifier Carol, with the private 
key 
CarolID
d , can varify that the message M is signed by a 
ring member listed in L through the equation hi = H(Z, L,
Ai) (0 ? i ? N – 1) and W1 = e(
CarolID
d ,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? ). Anyone without with the private key 
CarolID
d cannot compute e(
CarolID
d ,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? ).
Only the designated recipient Bob or the signer Alice,
with the secret parameter c, can prove to the verifier 
Carol that the message M is signed by a ring member 
listed in L. Anyone without the secret parameter c cannot 
compute e(
CarolID
Q , c). If the adversary tries to compute c
from (X1, c1), he need compute Y1 = e(
BobID
d ,X1) and it is 
hard problem without private key 
BobID
d .
We then show Zero Knowledge Proof of a Ring 
Signature is perfect zero-knowledge. Zero- knowledge 
proof of a ring signature can prevent the secret 
propagation. For a given message M and a ring member 
list L, Carol can construct a simulation of a proof 
transcript (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, W1, Y) as follows: 
Step 1. Choose random parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0,
…, AN–1, Y).  
Step 2. Compute Z = H(U || V || W || M || X || Y).
Step 3. Compute hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ? i ? N – 1) and W1
= e(
CarolID
d ,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? ).
Public Signature-Verifiability: If the designated 
recipient reveals the message M, the parameter Y and the 
parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, An–1, c), any verifier 
can check its validity by following the steps in Publicly 
Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature. Once a ring 
member creates a valid signature, the designated recipient 
can always prove to any verifier that the message M is 
signed by a ring member. 
Recipient-Ambiguity: If the actual signer and the legal 
recipient do not reveal the parameter ?, then any verifier 
cannot determine who is the real recipient, even though 
he gets M, Y and (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, c) in 
Publicly Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature. It is 
difficult for an adversary to drive the parameter ?. Since 
H4 is one-way hash function, the adversary cannot drive 
the parameter ? from the equation W = M ? H4(?). If he 
tries to compute the parameter ? from U = rP, V = ?
? 2 ( )Bob
r
IDH g without known private key BobIDd , he has 
to compute r from U, that is a hard DL problem. 
Designated-Verifier Recipient-Verifiability: 
Completeness of Zero Knowledge Proof of Recipient has 
been show in theorem 2.  
Here we examine soundness of Zero Knowledge Proof 
of Recipient. 
Only the designated verifier Carol, with the private 
key 
CarolID
d , can be authenticated by Bob through 
checking whether (P, Ppub, U1 + H(r3, T1, U1)
CarolID
Q , V1 ) 
is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. Anyone without private 
key 
CarolID
d cannot generate the signature of (r3, T1). If 
the adversary tries to impersonate Carol, he has to 
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forgery a legitimate signature of (r3, T1), that is a hard 
problem. 
Only the authenticated verifier Carol, with the private 
key 
CarolID
d , can verify that the message M is signed by a 
ring member listed in L through the equation hi = H(Z, L,
Ai) (0 ? i ? N – 1) and W1 = e(
CarolID
d ,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? ). Only the authenticated verifier
Carol, with the secret parameter r4, r5, can verify that the 
corresponding ring signature is sent to Bob through the 
equation W2 = H( 4
Bob
r
IDg ·
5rY ) where 
BobID
g = e(
BobID
Q ,
Ppub). Anyone without the secret parameter r4 and r5
cannot compute H( 4
Bob
r
IDg ·
5rY ).
Only the designated recipient Bob, with the secret 
parameter c and private key 
BobID
d , can prove to the 
verifier Carol that the corresponding ring signature is 
sent to Bob. Anyone without the secret parameter c and
private key 
BobID
d cannot compute e(
CarolID
Q , c) and 
H(e(
BobID
d , T1)).  
Zero Knowledge Proof of Recipient is also perfect 
zero-knowledge. For a given message M and recipient
IDBob listed in a ring member list L, Carol can construct a 
simulation of a proof transcript (r3, r4, r5, r6, L, U, V, W,
X, A0, …, AN–1, Y, h0, …, hN–1, T1, U1, V1, Z, W1, W2) as 
follows: 
Step 1. Choose random parameters (r3, r4, r5, r6, L, U,
V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, Y).
Step 2. Compute T1 = r4P + r5X, U1 = r6
CarolID
Q , V1 = 
(r6 + H(r3, T1, U1))
CarolID
d .
Step 3. Compute Z = H(U || V || W || M || X || Y).
Step 4. Compute hi = H(Z, L, Ai) (0 ? i ? N – 1) and W1
= e(
CarolID
d ,
1
0
( )
i
N
i i ID
i
A h Q
?
?
?? ).
Step 5: Compute W2 = H( 4
Bob
r
IDg ·
5rY ) where 
BobID
g =
e(
BobID
Q , Ppub).
Public Recipient-Verifiability: If the actual signer or 
the legal recipient reveals the message M, the parameter 
Y, ? and the parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, c),
any verifier can check its validity by following the steps 
in Publicly Verifiable Proof of Recipient. Once a ring 
member creates a valid signature, the actual signer or the 
legal recipient can always prove to any verifier that who 
is actually the designated recipient. If the illegal recipient 
Eve obtains the message M, the parameter Y and the 
parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A0, …, AN–1, c) in Publicly 
Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature and tries to prove 
that he is the legal recipient, he will seek two parameters 
?* and r* such that r* = H3(?*; M), U = r*P, V = ?*
?
*
2 ( )Eve
r
IDH g and W = M ? H4(?
*). But, it is extremely 
unlikely to have the corresponding parameters. 
Signer-Ambiguity: For a given signature, any verifier 
can only be convinced that the ring signature is actually 
produced by at least one of the possible signers. If the 
actual signer does not reveal the seed A, then any verifier 
cannot determine who is the actual signer. The limited 
anonymity is computational and depends on the security 
of the pseudorandom generator F.
Signer-Verifiability: According the analysis of Chow-
Yiu-Hui [13], the underlying ring signature scheme is 
non-forgeable. Only a ring member can generate a valid 
signature, the legal recipient can determine the possible 
signers. If the actual signer IDk reveals the seed A, which 
was used to generate all the nonsigners’ parameters Ai (i
? k), the recipient can check its validity by following the 
steps in Signer Verification. If a nonsigner IDl (l ? k) tries 
to misuse this technique to prove that he is the signer, he 
will seek a seed to generate all the parameters Ai (i ? l). 
But, it is extremely unlikely to have a corresponding 
seed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we defined secret leakage scheme which 
consist of seven procedures to protect the secret from 
propagating and anonymity of the participants. We also 
specified ten security properties of secret leakage scheme, 
i.e. Semantic-Security; Recipient-Designation; 
Verification-Dependence; Designated-Verifier Signature-
Verifiability; Public Signature-Verifiability; Recipient-
Ambiguity; Designated-Verifier Recipient-Verifiability; 
Public Recipient-Verifiability; Signer-Ambiguity; Signer-
Verifiability. At last, based on Chow-Yiu-Hui’s ID-based 
ring signature scheme and techniques of zero-knowledge 
proof we construct an ID-based controlled secret leakage 
scheme. We showed that the proposed scheme satisfies 
all security properties. The proposed scheme can also be 
used to establish trust in electronic commerce 
applications. 
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